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COMMENTARY
Fighting for Discursive Hegemony: The Kremlin’s Foundation Is Shaking
By Mario Baumann
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000477859
The backbone of Putin’s leadership has always been unswerving support from a large part of the Rus-
sian population. Putin’s accession to office was accompa-
nied by an aura of a new beginning and youth, contrast-
ing with the disillusionment of the Yeltsin era and the 
grim 1990s. After the swift economic upswing of Putin’s 
first two terms, the leadership’s support has been largely 
nourished by a narrative of external threat. The central-
ity of this narrative has been underlined by the recent 
events surrounding Kremlin critic Alexei Navalny. These 
events show, however, that the leadership is increasingly 
having trouble maintaining that logic.
The Kremlin has reacted stridently to Western 
accusations of the leadership’s complicity in the attack. 
Through questioning, ridiculing and discrediting the 
Western narrative, the Russian leadership has denied 
any involvement in the case. It has attempted to turn 
the tables and present Russia as the victim of an anti-
Russian conspiracy. According to this version of events, 
Western governments are not only unwilling to cooper-
ate in establishing the truth; it has also been suggested 
that the case was a staged operation (Lavrov 2021a), 
a mass disinformation campaign (Deutsche Welle 2020) 
resulting from anti-Russian hysteria (Russian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 2020).
This storyline resonates with the ongoing accusa-
tions of non-credibility and double standards that the 
Kremlin asserts against the West. The idea of the ‘out-
side enemy’ has become central to generating political 
support. Yet, the question is to what extent the Kremlin 
is actually successful in hegemonizing public discourse 
with this narrative of the ‘besieged fortress’.
With regard to the Navalny case, data provided by 
the Levada-Center (2020) draw a mixed picture. Out 
of all respondents aware of the issue, 30% subscribe 
to the idea of a staged operation and 19% believe the 
poisoning to be a provocation by Western intelligence 
services. Against these officially articulated narratives, 
only 15% support the version suggested by Western 
governments and institutions, namely that the incident 
was an attempt by the Russian leadership to eliminate 
a political opponent. Yet this interpretation of events 
is supported by the biggest share of those aged 24 or 
younger (34%). A similar picture emerges from polls 
on the Russia-wide protests after Navalny’s detention in 
January (Levada-Center 2021a). While feelings towards 
protestors are generally mixed among respondents, sym-
pathy is especially high among the young and those rely-
ing on non-traditional media sources.
This illustrates that the Russian official rhetoric is 
only partly successful in hegemonizing public discourse. 
It seems to struggle particularly with the young, who 
have no active memory of the instability of the pre-Putin 
years and, through the internet and social media, are 
most exposed to alternative narratives. While Putin’s 
approval ratings are still high (Levada-Center 2021b), 
they are nonetheless on an overall decline. The echo of 
Navalny’s latest investigative video indicates that the 
legitimacy of Putin as the protector of the Russian people 
against a corrupt elite and the oligarchy might be shak-
ing (Levada-Center 2021c).
Responses: Increasing Hostility and 
Repression
So far, the Kremlin’s response has been an ever more 
aggressive stance against the West and increasing repres-
sion against political dissent. Russia’s fierce reactions to 
Western accusations in the Navalny case have demon-
strated an unprecedented level of hostility, causing the 
country’s already-strained relations with the EU to sink 
to a new low.
The Kremlin’s rhetoric, however, not only discredits 
the challenge of an alternative Western interpretation—
it also serves to legitimate a tougher stance at home, 
thereby transferring internal dissent to the outside. 
Navalny, so it goes, is an instrument of either the CIA 
or German intelligence (Peskov 2020, Lavrov 2021b). 
This rhetorically legitimises the hard course of action 
against him, his team, and his supporters. The harsh 
crackdown on protestors during the January events is 
indicative of a growing authoritarian response to domes-
tic political challenges. Other signals include the recent 
confrontation with Twitter, the suppression of opposi-
tional activities, and the tightening of the foreign agent 
law, whose application has now been extended also to 
non-registered entities and individuals.
For the leadership, these two sources of instability—
Western accusations and growing internal dissent—are 
inextricably linked, since both challenge the authority of 
the official narrative. By lumping together any form of 
domestic political challenge with evil forces from abroad, 
the Kremlin thus aims to kill two birds with one stone. 
This strategy seeks to marginalise and discredit alterna-
tive interpretations from outside, to delegitimise dissent 
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within the country, and to justify the repressive mea-
sures taken to suppress those critics.
Implications for the EU’s Russia Policy
The EU ought to take the Kremlin’s besieged fortress 
narrative into account when devising its policy approach 
towards Russia. This narrative not only perpetuates the 
political deadlock between Brussels and Moscow, but 
also aids the latter in covering up the silencing of domes-
tic political dissent. Any policy must thus be evaluated 
against what effects it induces within the country—
and especially for those the Kremlin has rhetorically 
ostracised.
The Russian leadership’s defensive reaction to West-
ern accusations in the Navalny case has shown that 
a pro-government public discourse is crucial for the Rus-
sian leadership to keep up the appearance of legitimacy 
for its course of action. In response to the current crisis, 
the EU should therefore first and foremost vocally insist 
on the accountability of Russia’s leadership to its pop-
ulation. Human rights, democracy, and the rule of law 
are values Russia openly committed to as a member of 
multilateral institutions such as the Council of Europe, 
the OSCE, and the United Nations. Firmly insisting on 
this normative ground, the EU can argue with facts to 
challenge the Kremlin’s deflecting rhetoric while at the 
same time maintaining a basis for an inclusive vision 
for Europe that in the long run keeps alive the possibil-
ity of rapprochement and normalization.
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Foolproofing Putinism, or Why Mikhail Mishustin Might Be One of the 
Most Ambitious Prime Ministers in Recent Russian History
By Fabian Burkhardt (Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies, Regensburg)
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000477859
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin has been tacitly pressing ahead with an ambitious vision to 
reshape public administration. The main purpose of 
this advance is to foolproof the Russian state against 
the drawbacks of the heavy-handed top–down mode of 
governance of late Putinism, and to squeeze as much as 
possible out of the stagnant Russian state while avoid-
ing any fundamental change.
The Meta-Reform: The Government’s 
Coordination Center
“I think he will start with reforming public administra-
tion [gosupravlenie],” said Sberbank’s German Gref on 
16 January 2020, one day after Mishustin was appointed 
prime minister. While Mishustin is best known for the 
digital transformation of Russia’s tax service, his vision 
as PM is more ambitious: Mishustin did indeed launch 
an administrative reform the scope of which is only com-
parable to the one initiated in 2003–2004. A so-called 
“Coordination Center” was created on 22 February 2021, 
and can be considered the centerpiece of this reform. It 
is attached to the government’s in-house think tank, the 
Analytical Center, and is headed by Deputy PM Dmi-
try Chernyshenko.
The idea goes back to 2015 when President Vladimir 
Putin tasked Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev with 
designing a specialized “project office”. The philosophy 
behind this obscure “office” has been most clearly laid 
out by Sberbank’s German Gref, who can be consid-
ered the founding father of what would later become 
the Coordination Center.
Gref ’s view might be summarized as follows: The 
state of Russia’s economy is rotten. But before any mean-
ingful reforms can be launched, the quality and capacity 
of the state’s public administration should be enhanced, 
ideally with the help of big business: agile project man-
agement, performance measurement, and of course dig-
ital transformation. This meta-reform therefore would 
need to tackle the vertical governance style characteris-
tic of the Russian state. And the archaic top–down sys-
tem would have to be replaced by modern public man-
agement practices such as performance management.
Gref is famous for having become infatuated with 
PEMANDU, the “Performance Management and Deliv-
ery Unit” formed in 2009 to monitor Malaysia’s “Gov-
ernment Transformation Program”. On 30 June 2016, 
Putin created the Presidential Council on Strategic 
Development and Priority Projects, essentially a coor-
dination and monitoring group for the 2012 May dec-
rees. Presidential aide Andrei Belousov was, as the main 
watchdog for the implementation of the 2012 May dec-
rees, appointed secretary of the Council. In parallel, 
a department for project management was created 
within the PM’s executive office [Apparat Pravitel’stva].
Even though there were major issues with the imple-
mentation of the 2012 May Decrees, they were to a large 
degree repackaged into the 2018 National Projects, and 
with the reappointment of the Medvedev government 
after the 2018 presidential elections, the previous man-
agement structure of the May Decrees was mostly kept 
intact. The reactivation of the State Council did not help 
much to improve feedback mechanisms between the 
center and the regions: in some spheres, such as salaries 
for certain categories of state employees, most regions 
even rolled back and fell behind the 2018 targets.
The reason why the Medvedev government had 
to step down simultaneously on 15 January 2020 has 
largely remained in the dark. Medvedev had been 
increasingly seen as a hindrance for meta-reforming 
the Russian state: with the National Projects, Russia 
had its answer to the Malaysian Government Transfor-
mation Program in place, but a functioning “delivery 
office” and performance management was largely absent. 
While PEMANDU promised “big, fast results,” Med-
vedev played it small and slow.
The main question, of course, is whether Mishus-
tin’s elevation is simply yet another restructuring of the 
executive without changing the bigger picture. Mishus-
tin at least appears to be motivated to act “big and fast”.
First, the federal executive will be shrunk by about 
32,000 staff units, with cuts at the center of up to 5 per-
cent and in the regions of up to 10 percent of staff (mostly 
by cutting currently vacant positions). By contrast, the 
PM’s office is being expanded to 1.792 staff. More impor-
tantly, the PM’s office should move away from merely 
servicing 61 government commissions and focus on 
policy work instead: the PM’s office now mirrors the 
Cabinet of Ministers, which should bolster its capabil-
ity to coordinate policy and solve impasses. The restruc-
turing of Russia’s sprawling 40 development institu-
tions, some of them under the roof of Igor Shuvalov’s 
VEB (such as Skolkovo and Rosnano), should also be 
seen in this context: while six of them will be liquidated 
altogether, the functions of the others are meant to be 
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restructured in order to facilitate coordinated implemen-
tation of national development goals. Part of this reform 
is not only an audit of key performance indicators for 
the various developmental organizations and state cor-
porations, but also cuts to staff, salaries and privileges.
Second, the Coordination Council is not a subordi-
nate unit within the PM’s office as the project depart-
ment was, but rather a task force in its own right directly 
under Deputy PM Chernyshenko. The statute defines 
three main functions: incident management, priority 
tasks, and special projects. Moreover, decisions by the 
Center are obligatory for all federal executive bodies. In 
short, the Coordination Council will become the gov-
ernment’s main troubleshooter. Last year, a predecessor 
task force had to solve “incidents” relating to bonus pay-
ment arrears for doctors working with Covid-19 patients, 
the provision of hot meals to pupils and the liquida-
tion of deficits with certain drugs. Among the priority 
tasks, for example, is the coordination of government 
support for Russia’s nine most economically depressed 
regions. The main idea behind the Center is to alleviate 
the drawbacks of top–down governance with more hor-
izontal project-based work across executive officials and 
agencies. All of this should help to create an analytical 
ecosystem that supersedes the usual information bar-
riers between vertically organized ministries and exe-
cutive agencies.
Mishustin’s “Social Networks” and Russia’s 
Data-Driven Authoritarianism
One of the main challenges to making the Coordina-
tion Council work is “digital feudalism,” the more than 
800 information systems within the executive with little 
compatibility and the bureaucrats who collect and insert 
(often manipulated) data into these systems. The pro-
posed solution relates to the “state as platform” idea pro-
posed by Aleksei Kudrin’s Center for Strategic Develop-
ment (CSR): such a data-driven state would serve as the 
main integrator for seamless communication between 
citizens, business and state executive bodies. But so far, 
data, Russia’s “new oil,” remains “dirty oil”: In 2019, 
the government approved the National System for Data 
Management (NSUD) to synchronize hundreds of state 
databases and create unified rules for the collection, 
manipulation, storage and usage of this data. How-
ever, regional pilot projects have exposed major issues 
with coordination among executive bodies with func-
tional overlap.
Much more successful is the public services platform 
Gosuslugi, which reached 126 million users by the end 
of 2020, with 24 million having registered in that year 
alone. Around 70 million Russians are verified users of 
the Unified System for Identification and Authentica-
tion (ESIA) and are therefore entitled to use e-govern-
ment services fully online via Gosuslugi. By linking ver-
ified Gosuslugi user profiles with the manifold state data 
bases in a unified data structure including between 20 
and 60 categories of data on citizens, a “Digital Citizen 
Profile” will increasingly allow the Russian government 
to facilitate seamless data flows between the state, cit-
izens and business (first and foremost banks). This will 
create abundant opportunities for citizen surveillance. 
But the Coordination Center is as the government’s in-
house think tank also called upon to improve feedback 
mechanisms with the population; to this end, the plat-
form Gosuslugi—Reshaem Vmeste (Let’s decide together) 
is being introduced in all federal subjects. Linking cit-
izen complaints to e-government services in this way 
does not only create an early-warning system for citizen 
grievances, but is also a useful addition to the Krem-
lin’s Centers for Regional Management (TsUR), which 
collect complaints about regional authorities on social 
media. Research shows that this kind of digital par-
ticipatory governance is likely to increase votes for the 
incumbent.
Increased presidential powers in the wake of the 
2020 constitutional changes exacerbate the “bad gov-
ernance” associated with overcentralization and person-
alist rule. In the run-up to the long electoral cycle of the 
2021 Duma elections and the 2024 presidential elec-
tions, Mishustin’s administrative tweaks are intended 
to counterbalance the governance risks that accompany 
the zeroing of Putin’s presidential terms.
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Fear and Loathing in Russia: Repressions as a Tool of Kremlin’s Rule
By Vladimir Gel’man (European University at St. Petersburg and University of Helsinki)
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000477859
Since 2012, the Kremlin has relied upon extensive use of selective political repressions vis-à-vis its rivals in 
various forms. These attacks have gone far beyond the 
most infamous cases, the killing of Boris Nemtsov in 
2015 and poisoning of Alexei Navalny in 2020. Every 
instance of mass protest has faced Kremlin counter-
attacks, which have included overt intimidation, public 
discrediting of critics, and persecution, harassment and 
violent coercion of opposition activists and/or supporters. 
The most recent wave of protests in January 2021, soon 
after the arrest and imprisonment of Navalny, resulted 
in detainment and arrest of thousands of participants 
across the country, mostly in Moscow and St. Peters-
burg. What are the major features of these repressions, 
and to what extent might they help to preserve Krem-
lin rule over time?
Political repressions under authoritarianism perform 
both punitive and signaling functions. First and fore-
most, their immediate goal is punishment and (if pos-
sible) elimination of actual and/or potential challengers 
to the regime. At the same time, the Russian govern-
ment pursues repressions (or threat thereof) aimed at 
preventing the spread of public discontent towards anti-
regime mobilization and aversion of spread of organized 
opposition across various segments of Russian society. 
Thus, regime critics receive a strong signal about the 
risks of unconventional behavior for their career and 
well-being, and may be less willing to be involved in 
anti-regime activism. To some extent, this approach to 
political repressions resembles those in the late Soviet 
Union, which in the 1960s pivoted from the use of mass 
repressions to selective targeting of dissident activism, 
a strategy which was able to contain it to a certain degree. 
While the number of political prisoners in the Soviet 
Union at that time never exceeded several hundred per-
sons, preemptive control and monitoring enabled the 
Communist regime to avoid protest mobilization until 
the years of perestroika. In a sense, this experience serves 
as a role model for present-day Russia’s rulers.
According to comparative studies, the scope and 
intensity of repressions towards regime opponents 
depends upon a combination of three factors. First, 
threat perceptions of rulers have forced them to rely 
upon repressions even when the danger of overthrow 
by dissenters is not very strong. Second, the previous 
experience of successful use of repressions for curbing 
protests is usually considered as an argument in favor 
of further reliance on these tools. Third, as co-optation 
and repressions serve as two sides of the same coin, eco-
nomic stagnation puts limits on the rewarding of loyal 
active citizens by the regime, and contributes to increase 
of sanctions for disloyalty. Russia’s recent experience fits 
these arguments. The Kremlin’s narratives wildly exag-
gerated the threat of “color revolutions”, especially after 
the 2014 regime change in Ukraine. During the first 
wave of repressions, launched in 2012 after post-elec-
tion protests (the Bolotnaya Square case), some dozens 
activists were imprisoned and several hundred fled Rus-
sia, quieting opposition activism for a while. From the 
viewpoint of the Kremlin, this experience, alongside 
vicious attacks on independent media and NGOs, was 
quite successful, and encouraged the regime to crack 
down harder during the next wave of protests during 
the 2019 Moscow City Duma elections and later on in 
2021. Finally, amid the stagnation of real incomes of 
Russians in 2010s–2020s, the Kremlin was unwilling to 
buy Russians’ loyalty and less inclined to offer enough 
side payments for satellite parties such as the KPRF. Also, 
unlike in the 2000s, the Kremlin no longer expands the 
pool of its supporters through support for loyalist youth 
movements, NGOs, and the like.
The expansion of scope and intensity of repressions in 
Russia recently developed in several directions. The list 
of potential targets, initially limited to NGOs (labeled 
as “foreign agents” and faced with many restrictions 
and fines), extended to media and individuals as well as 
other non-registered organized entities (such as regional 
networks of Navalny’s headquarters), who faced even 
more severe restrictions and fines. The repressive reg-
ulations in Russia went further to cover new territory, 
such as “enlightenment activities”, which were consid-
ered by the Russian parliament (who proposed a new 
bill aimed at their state licensing) as a dangerous chan-
nel of Western influence. Regulations of Internet and 
social media with criminalization of “fake news” and 
other forms of spread of unwanted information as well 
as threats to switch off certain website and services for 
Russian users also became tougher by the 2020s. Sec-
ond, punishment of protesters become more severe by 
2021, as fines, typical for the 2010s, were replaced by 
more arrests and criminal cases against activists. Third, 
vested interests of the coercive apparatus of the Rus-
sian state, which expanded its size through building of 
special anti-extremist departments in different agencies, 
also played an important role in increasing the scope 
of repressions, and instances of cases fabricated and/or 
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pushed by certain officials (such as the Network case or 
the Yury Dmitriev affair) demonstrated this tendency.
Figure 1: The Scope of Arrests and Fines after Politi-
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Source: https://www.proekt.media/research/statistika-arestov-mitingi/
As of yet, repressions have brought only partial suc-
cesses for the Kremlin. Punishments of activists curbed 
opposition activism for a while, but they were not able 
to eliminate protests completely. Signaling of repressions 
in Russia in the atmosphere of fear and loathing faces 
a rising discontent of Russians with the regime, espe-
cially among the Russian youth. These contradictions 
between popular demands for change and the regime’s 
supply of preserving the political status quo at any cost 
are likely to increase in the wake of the upcoming 2021 
State Duma elections. Meanwhile, the Kremlin’s increas-
ing over-reliance upon repressions as the major tool of its 
rule is a risky game because of the great empowerment of 
the coercive apparatus of the Russian state. In a number 
of autocracies, similar tendencies have paved the way to 
military coups against unpopular dictators who have lost 
their legitimacy. To what extent Russia’s leadership will 
be able to avert these risks remains to be seen.
About the Author
Vladimir Gel’man is Professor at the European University at St. Petersburg and the University of Helsinki. He is the 
author of Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015) and has 
been published in Democratization, Europe-Asia Studies, Post-Soviet Affairs, and other journals.
References
• Dixon R., 2021, Inside Russia’s Mass Arrests: Claims of Beatings, Threats, and ‘War’ against Rights Monitors, 
Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-navalny-protesters-abuses/2021/02/26/
c5d8856c-6aef-11eb-a66e-e27046e9e898_story.html
• Gel’man V., 2016, The Politics of Fear: How Russia’s Rulers counter their Rivals, Russian Politics, https://doi.
org/10.1163/24518921-00101002
• Rogov K., 2018, The Art of Coercion: Repressions and Repressiveness in Putin’s Russia, Russian Politics, https://
doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00302001
Elections 2021: Tense Atmosphere, Likely Regime Victory, and Uncertain 
Policy Outcomes
By Boris Ginzburg and Alexander Libman (both Free University Berlin)
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000477859
1 Kobak, D. (2021). Excess mortality reveals Covid’s true toll in Russia. Significance, 18(1), 16-19.
2 https://www.forbes.ru/biznes/396629-pandemiya-so-skidkoy-rossiya-vydelila-na-pomoshch-naseleniyu-i-biznesu-v-70-raz-menshe
For electoral authoritarian regimes like the Russian one, elections are always causes for concern. How-
ever, the Russian leadership has particular reasons for 
worrying about the Duma elections of 2021.
Russia enters the election year in rather bad shape from 
an economic point of view. Since 2013, the country has 
experienced economic stagnation. The Covid-19 pandemic 
has hit Russia hard, with an estimated 260,000 excess 
deaths from April to November 20201 and with the gov-
ernment providing much smaller economic assistance to the 
population and to businesses than most large economies.2 
The pandemic contributed to the further decline of Putin’s 
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popularity, which was already suffering after the pension 
reform of 2018.3 However, some level of dissatisfaction 
with Putin is driven simply by the length of his rule – Rus-
sian society (like most other societies worldwide) is getting 
tired of the leader who has been in office for two decades.
In addition to these fundamental developments, several 
recent political events are likely to make Russian leaders ner-
vous. The return of Aleksey Navalny to Russia and his sub-
sequent arrest are likely to make him an undisputed leader 
of the Russian non-systemic opposition (and a leader who 
is recognized by the international community). Protests in 
Belarus in 2020 show that even carefully planned elections 
can lead to unexpected public protests. In the eyes of the 
Russian leadership, Belarus and Navalny are parts of the 
general aggressive stance of the West which call for vigilance.
At the same time, the 2021 elections are likely to 
look like a window of opportunity in the eyes of the 
Russian non-systemic opposition as well. The experience 
of smart voting strategies provides the opposition with 
a tool it can use in the upcoming elections. There have 
been multiple episodes in recent years of Russians vot-
ing in a different way than the Kremlin would expect at 
the regional and local level, and the opposition can hope 
for similar surprises to occur during the 2021 elections.
As a result, for both the regime and the non-systemic 
opposition, the upcoming elections are far from ‘business 
as usual’, and this will most likely affect their strategies. 
To optimize its chances, the Kremlin will mainly rely on 
a rich repertoire of manipulative and repressive measures 
against its opponents like the passing of new repressive 
laws aiming to hamper the smart voting strategy, vio-
lent crackdowns on peaceful demonstrations, disinfor-
mation tactics aimed at driving wedges between different 
parts of the non-systemic opposition, and the creation 
of Kremlin-loyal pseudo-oppositional parties to absorb 
some of the regime-critical votes (for example Novye 
Lyudi, created in 2020).4 The Kremlin could also try to 
instrumentalize Navalny’s further physical and mental 
well-being in prison as a tool to blackmail his team and 
to constrain its actions. The annual State of the Nation 
address Putin has to deliver (the date of which is as of 
yet unannounced) would offer the regime the possibil-
ity to announce unexpected moves (e.g., generous social 
spending or major policy reforms) which the opposition 
will have no chance to prepare for.
The toolbox of the non-systemic opposition is more 
limited than that of the Kremlin, but the opposition is 
likely to utilize it as thoroughly as possible. One can 
expect the non-systemic opposition to attempt to further 
3 https://carnegie.ru/commentary/84052
4 See also: https://meduza.io/feature/2020/01/10/v-rossii-poyavyatsya-neskolko-novyh-partiy-vklyuchaya-partiyu-razrabotchika-igry-world-
of-tanks-oni-budut-sozdavat-oschuschenie-politicheskoy-konkurentsii
5 https://www.yavlinsky.ru/article/bez-putinizma-i-populizma/
build up the smart voting approach, to organize targeted 
protest rallies (with specific and attractive political agen-
das, rather than simple regular events without a clear mes-
sage), to raise the international community’s awareness of 
state repressions in order to internationally delegitimize 
the current Russian regime, and thereby convince Wash-
ington and Brussels to toughen their sanction agendas.
The systemic opposition under these circumstances 
finds itself in a complex situation. On the one hand, it 
could benefit from smart voting. On the other hand, the 
Kremlin would most likely expect much stronger guaran-
tees of loyalty from the parties allowed to run for parlia-
ment. On top of that, the readiness of the systemic opposi-
tion to cooperate with Navalny is not a given, as a recent 
article from Yabloko party leader Grigory Yavlinsky shows. 
Yavlinsky warns his readers about Navalny’s nationalist 
and populist roots.5 For Yavlinsky, unwillingness to make 
any ideological compromises has been the cornerstone of 
his political stance since the mid-1990s; however, this also 
means that the opportunities for cooperation between 
Yabloko and Navalny (e.g., placement of Lyubov Sobol on 
the Yabloko party list) seem to be questionable.
The heightened risk perception on the side of the regime 
and the willingness of the non-systemic opposition to use 
the window of opportunity will lead to a highly tense atmos-
phere around the upcoming elections. To exacerbate the 
uncertainty, ultimately, the strategies chosen by the actors 
will depend not on the objective political situation and the 
attitude of the public (which in the Russian case remains 
unknown), but on the way the situation is perceived. One 
can only speculate how Putin himself interprets the cur-
rent situation in Russia and where he sees the main chal-
lenges to his rule. In any case, political miscalculations on 
the side of all actors are highly likely, and possible over- (or 
under-)reactions could produce unforeseen consequences.
By far the most likely scenario remains that the regime 
will manage to retain control of the Duma and to pre-
vent (or suppress) protests. Still, the election’s aftermath 
will create a fog of uncertainty about the further policy 
consequences for Russia. One can expect either an eas-
ing of the Kremlin’s current repressive grip with a certain 
attempt to improve relations with the West or the com-
plete opposite, the Kremlin politically locking itself into 
its current repressive and isolationist vision, or the combi-
nation of both strategies. Again, perceptions of the regime, 
rather than real developments on the ground, will be the 
deciding factor (Belarus could become an important test-
ing ground Russian leadership will draw lessons from).
Please see overleaf for information about the authors.
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Before the Duma Elections, Russia is Moving Forward with E-Voting. 
Why, and With What Potential Consequences?
By Stas Gorelik (George Washington University / Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of 
Bremen)
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1 One of the candidates from that electoral district filed official complaints and even created a web resource about the case: https://evoting.ru/
en (accessed 25 March 2021).
Abstract
Numerous experiments with voting technologies 
have been recently taking place in Russia. For 
instance, the role of online voting has been con-
stantly increasing since 2019, and this trend seems 
set to continue in the coming 2021 elections. Why 
is the Kremlin tolerating and even promoting such 
innovations? In fact, they can boost the current Rus-
sian regime’s legitimacy and allow for “stealth” elec-
toral manipulation. However, they seem to be very 
unlikely to prevent post-election protests if struc-
tural conditions for them arise.
The Spread of New Voting Technologies in 
Russia
Quite unexpectedly, online voting (officially called dis-
tantsionnoye elektronnoye golosovaniye) was introduced 
during the Moscow Duma elections in 2019 (Meduza 
2019), though only in three city electoral districts 
(okrugs). The next year, in Spring 2020, it was decided 
that independent candidates who have to collect cit-
izens’ signatures to run for regional parliaments would 
be allowed to do so online through the gosuslugi.ru por-
tal. Furthermore, more than one million voters from 
Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod Regions could partici-
pate online in the constitutional plebiscite (TASS 2020, 
RBK 2020). This year, nine regions may organize e-vot-
ing in the Duma and other elections, according to the 
Central Election Commission (Golosinfo 2021).
On the one hand, these innovations may look rea-
sonable in light of the pandemic. Yet, they seem to be 
unlikely to curb electoral fraud. In fact, even the lim-
ited use of online voting in the 2019 Moscow Duma 
elections led to a scandal, in which anomalous support 
for a candidate supported by the city administration 
was detected in one of the “online precincts”.1 In gen-
eral, online voting tools in Russia have been developed 
hastily and without proper independent oversight. For 
instance, it is still unclear how exactly an online voting 
system will function in the coming elections and how 
civil society will be able to monitor it (Golosinfo 2021).
How the Kremlin Can Capitalize on These 
New Technologies
To begin with, the introduction and increasing use of 
these technologies can be employed as a legitimation 
instrument to demonstrate that the current regime is 
actually reacting to some voters’ dissatisfaction with 
the integrity of elections. For instance, the innovation 
of allowing potential candidates to obtain popular sup-
port for their bids through gosuslugi.ru may be con-
sidered a response to the 2019 Moscow protests, which 
started when many opposition politicians were disqual-
ified under the pretext of them having provided invalid 
signatures in their registration applications.
More importantly, in order to use online voting sys-
tems for stealing votes or adding them to the “right” 
candidates, authorities do not need to rely on inter-
mediaries, such as local election officials or directors 
of state-owned enterprises. Illicit activities such as bal-
lot stuffing or threats to fire employees disloyal to the 
ruling party are sometimes detected by activists, which 
sometimes makes such intermediaries wary (Harvey 
2020). Meanwhile, some research on protest mobiliza-
tion in response to police repression (Sutton, Butcher, 
& Svensson 2014) and on post-election demonstrations 
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(e.g., Kuntz & Thompson 2009) shows that visual and/or 
readily available evidence of authorities’ misconduct can 
significantly increase the likelihood of protests. Obtain-
ing such evidence during online voting is hard. Even in 
the case of mounting public criticism, new voting tech-
nologies can be just scrapped, as occurred in 2011 in 
Kazakhstan, where electronic voting machines had been 
introduced in the early 2000s (Kassen 2020). By doing 
so, the Kremlin may again score legitimacy points by 
showing its supposed responsiveness.
Finally, authorities can use the practices of e-voting 
and online collection of citizens’ signatures in strategic 
ways that are “safe” for the regime. For instance, e-vot-
ing may be sanctioned only in the regime’s strongholds. 
In Azerbaijan’s 2008 parliamentary elections, video cam-
eras were less likely to be installed in supposedly “prob-
lematic” precincts, where blatant fraud was needed to 
2 It is true that the approval rates for the constitutional amendments among those who voted online in Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod were 
lower than the country’s total of almost 78%: around 62% and around 60%, respectively. Yet, it is striking that the amendments were not 
rejected even by online voters, whom one may assume to be more liberal-minded than the average Russian voter.
ensure the desired outcome (Sjoberg 2014).2 As for voters’ 
signatures, candidates for regional parliaments may be 
allowed to collect only up to 50% of them online. This 
leaves authorities quite some room for disqualifications 
under the conventional pretext (Bækken 2015) of “val-
idating” physical signatures.
New voting technologies may worsen the situation 
with electoral manipulation in Russia, both in the com-
ing elections and thereafter, yet they seem to be unlikely 
to prevent mass discontent if conditions for it are ripe. 
As some cross-national research shows, post-election 
protests happen not or not only because of fraud per se. 
They are more likely when citizens become disenchanted 
with the ruling regime due to socio-economic hardships 
(Brancati 2014) and start to hope for changes (Lucardi 
2019). In such situations, any result favoring the ruling 
regime may become a trigger.
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Will Putin’s Regime Survive?
By Andreas Heinemann-Grüder (University of Bonn and Bonn International Centre for Conversion)
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000477859
Putin’s regime is a learning authoritarian system, not immune to crises but resilient. Russia no longer rep-
resents an electoral autocracy since elections have degen-
erated into plebiscites without any meaningful alter-
native. Many decisions are taken on an ad hoc basis, 
excluding institutions and beyond legal constraints 
that award legitimacy and ensure quality. In Putin’s 
Russia, the absolutism of the autocrat, the tone-deaf-
ness of its leading circle and the autonomy of the secu-
rity apparatuses reinforce each other. Since 2012, Pres-
ident Putin has been taking legal and repressive actions 
and has heavily invested in media campaigns to safe-
guard his regime and to protect it from interferences 
he deems dangerous. Putin’s preventive counter-revo-
lution has been successful so far, criminalizing inde-
pendent civil society, discrediting opposition forces as 
a fifth column of the West, controlling the mass media 
and instrumentalizing social media, enlarging the out-
reach of the security apparatuses and successfully car-
rying out cyber attacks.
Putin’s regime will survive as long as it commands 
sufficient state capacity. The security services and the 
judicial system monopolize public violence; the state is 
capable of levying taxes and extracting other resources; 
it provides basic public services. Bureaucratic procedures 
are functional. Russia did not lose a war. Putin’s rule 
has compensated for the loss of Russia’s status after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, made forgettable the 
uneasiness of having been economically overtaken by the 
Soviet Union’s former allies in Eastern Europe and China. 
Putin also defused and substituted the never-admitted 
collective shame over Soviet mass atrocities by spread-
ing a sense of Russia’s and the Soviet Union’s historical 
greatness. Putin’s revenge for the Russian Versailles syn-
drome resonates among those age cohorts that spent their 
formative years in Soviet times and during the 1990s.
Russia’s authoritarian regression fits into the global 
trend of democratic stalemate and reversal over the 
last two decades. While open military and one-party-
regimes are growing less common, personalist regimes 
are quite persistent. The problem of Putin’s succession 
is not solved, but succession crises should not be over-
estimated: Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenis-
tan and Uzbekistan have solved their succession prob-
lems without causing systemic crises.
Yet, political regimes usually become unstable once 
social and political upward mobility is suppressed, when-
ever a gerontocracy (as in the late Brezhnev period) is 
cemented, and when the number of regime beneficiaries 
shrinks. The kleptocracy of the camarilla could count 
on silent approval as long as the regime was able to 
hand out clientelistic goods. However, its social clien-
tele is shrinking, and this causes discontent, especially 
among the urban middle class.
The more Putin’s regime radicalizes itself, the more 
some sources of its legitimacy evaporate—his image 
as anti-Yeltsin, James Bond or messiah. Appeals to the 
values of the homo sovieticus, to Orthodox traditions or 
hurray patriotism after the annexation of Crimea are 
losing traction. The generation born after the dissolu-
tion of the Soviet Union is beyond the reach of Kremlin 
propaganda and state TV. State-sponsored movements 
such as the former “Nashi” no longer mobilize the youth. 
Support for the regime is trending downwards. Russia’s 
governance model as a petro-state is out of fashion; the 
fossil age is coming to an end.
The radicalization of Putin’s regime is also a result 
of the structure of political power. Radicalization does 
not result from ideological worldviews; the leading circle 
in the Kremlin is anti-liberal, but otherwise free of any 
weltanschauung. Decisions are taken by a tiny circle of 
Putin’s cronies without institutional or personal counter-
weights. The inner circle operates in an unthinking, ster-
eotypical manner. While power derives from being close 
to the president, there are several “verticals of power”. 
Each actor in the institutional arrangement has to weigh 
which channel of influence is most advantageous. Russia 
consists of a system of competing case managers (kura-
tory). However, who is the most favored is not always 
easy to discern. In Russia’s political regime, autocracy 
is combined with anarchy. This leads to bad decisions 
which have to be covered up or corrected. The constant 
pressure to hide mistakes and deficits leads to nervous-
ness, blame-shifting and the suggestion of radical solu-
tions. The failed attempt to murder Alexey Navalny is 
a case in point, Bellingcat and Navalny’s team exposing 
the perpetrators. These kinds of failures lead to a search 
for the guilty party.
The respective syndrome of failure has to be cor-
rected. Finally, radicalization results from the autonomy 
of and competition between the security services, espe-
cially the secret services. Over time, the modus oper-
andi of the Kadyrov regime in the Chechnyan Repub-
lic of the Russian Federation has been diffusing from 
the Russian periphery to the center, including contract 
killings and employing irregular paramilitary forces.
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The behavior of the security services will determine 
the regime’s trajectory in the years to come; they can side 
with the incumbent, stay neutral or defect. Their calcu-
lus will be informed by their assessment of the power 
configuration (nobody likes to side with the loser), the 
prospect of amnesty (no tribunals), the danger of insta-
bility spilling over to their organization (no decay of the 
army or police as in the late Soviet and immediate post-
Soviet case), the expected impact on patronage (who 
will lose privileges) and the regime challengers’ offers 
regarding incorporation. The murder of the former spy 
Litvinenko in London and the attempted murder of the 
former spy Skripal in Salisbury deter potential defec-
tors. The regime will deter civil society from autonomous 
activities and use targeted violence against opposition 
leaders, but is likely to shy away from shooting at mass 
demonstrators—as did Gaddafi, Assad and Yanuko-
vych. Putin will opt for harsh riot control instead of 
“bloody Sundays”.
With his exposure of the rottenness of Putin’s klep-
tocracy and the sultanism of his cronies, Alexey Navalny 
was temporarily able to set the agenda of public com-
munication. Like a person running amok, Navalny tried 
to force Putin into a decisive battle rallying the dis-
contented around his martyrdom. Putin’s spin doctors 
had to react, and they did by defaming, arresting and 
sentencing Navalny. Navalny targeted the personalist 
nature of Putin’s regime, employing the policy style of 
a charismatic, populist and polarizing leader himself. 
Yet, any group of future challengers in Russia has to 
offer a programmatic alternative to Putinism, i.e., more 
than a mere replacement of the incumbent, and incen-
tives to defect from the current winning coalition. Elite 
splits are more likely to end Putin’s reign than protest.
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Strategies for Russia: Avoiding a New Cold War
By David Lane (Cambridge University)
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000477859
It is now over twenty years since President Putin first appeared at the apex of the Russian political elite. 
Since that time, relations with the West have cumula-
tively deteriorated. Russia’s support for the secession of 
Crimea and the West’s view of Russia’s ‘hybrid’ warfare 
have led to a dominant political discourse of a new ‘cold 
war’. Donald Trump’s initial attempts to improve rela-
tions with President Putin were sabotaged. Current rela-
tions between Russia and NATO, the United States, the 
United Kingdom and the European Union are increas-
ingly hostile and include sanctions which have hurt not 
only Russian companies but also its citizens. The UK’s 
current foreign policy review (March 2021), for exam-
ple, will raise the cap on the number of British nuclear 
weapons and will extend their use to retaliation against 
cyber-attack. Even against the background of the enor-
mous domestic costs of the 2008 world financial cri-
sis and the 2020 coronavirus pandemic, it is planned 
to increase the UK’s military budget. The UK is mani-
festly responding to former President Trump’s exhorta-
tions for the Europeans to pull their weight in NATO to 
sustain their own defence. Russia and China are clearly 
in the sights as actual or potential aggressor powers. One 
major future task for President Putin will be to try to 
improve relations; if he is unsuccessful, he will have to 
find means to strengthen Russia’s defences.
President Gorbachev faced similar problems and 
adopted a reform position which ended the Cold War. 
This is unlikely to be necessary or repeated by President 
Putin. Gorbachev came to power on a reform platform 
resting on a weak economic and strategic base. Putin has 
consolidated power. His attempts to join the hegemonic 
powers have failed: Putin was ignominiously excluded 
from the G8 group of countries. Domestically, Putin is 
unchallenged ideologically and has no effective politi-
cal opposition: there is no ‘reform movement’, no likely 
‘coloured revolution’. The West is divided. The Euro-
pean Union has lost its image of freedom and prosper-
ity, and Germany needs Russia’s energy supply. The 
defection of the UK from the European Union will 
weaken the influence of the Atlantic alliance in Europe 
and strengthen European moves to normalise relations 
with Russia.
Perhaps of greater importance is the fact that Rus-
sia under Putin does not pose an ideological or strategic 
threat in the same way as the USSR once did. The alleged 
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poisoning of double agent Sergei Skripal and his daugh-
ter, Yulia, in 2018 appears to be the main charge of the 
British government against the current Russian regime. 
But with the loss of the EU market, Britain also needs 
new trading partners. In the current international con-
text, there seems to be no political or economic basis for 
a new cold war. Russia is most likely to continue with 
its policy of competitive interdependence with the West.
Of greater concern is the West’s relationship with 
China, which is now the West’s ‘significant other’. The 
current British defence, security and foreign policy 
review considers China’s power ‘to be the most signifi-
cant geopolitical factor of the 2020s’. While ‘socialism 
with Chinese characteristics’ in its current form is hardly 
an ideological ‘challenge’ to global neo-liberalism, Chi-
na’s economic and technological advance certainly does 
put in in competition with many Western companies. 
China presents an economic challenge to the hegemony 
of the USA which underlies the worsening relations 
between the two countries under Donald Trump and 
Joe Biden. The cloak of support for competitive electoral 
democracy, human rights, and the sanctity of interna-
tional law hides the USA’s awareness of the Thucydides’ 
trap: China is the ascendant challenger. President Xi Jin-
ping is aware of this and has warned against any adver-
sary taking precipitous military action. China, however, 
in not yet strong enough unilaterally to defeat military 
action by the USA. The formation of the One Belt One 
Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organ-
isation as well as treaties with other states are an indica-
tion that China needs, and seeks, allies. Clearly, a pact 
with Russia would create a strategic and military bloc 
which would severely weaken the USA’s military hege-
mony and form a military balance of power. A West 
European strategy, led by Germany, to avert a strength-
ening of political and military linkages between Russia 
and China might well move to a European understand-
ing with Russia. The current policy of demonising Pres-
ident Putin is counterproductive: it diminishes Russia 
as a sovereign state, denies it a status as a world power 
and concurrently creates the preconditions for a Sino–
Russian pact. President Putin is faced with the dilemma 
of how strongly Russia should be coupled with an East-
ern alliance led by China.
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Citizen versus Strongman: Revival, Social Class, and Social Decay in 
Russia’s Autocracy
By Tomila Lankina (London School of Economics and Political Science)
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000477859
As Russia approaches parliamentary elections in Sep-tember 2021, analysts confront a polar set of factors 
and dynamics that give significant fuel to both the “glass 
half full” and “glass half empty” sets of sentiments. Let 
us start with factors related to the global context. Across 
the world—whether in Myanmar, Belarus, Russia, or 
Hong Kong—citizens have been taking to the streets 
in peaceful pro-democracy protests. Simultaneously, we 
are seeing the rise and emboldening of the autocratic 
strongman. Unencumbered by considerations of the 
sanctity of human life, rights, or dignity, dictatorships 
and mild autocracies masking as democracies have sig-
nalled that repression is effective as rulers increasingly 
break the contract with their people and engage in pop-
ular repression. While citizens across the post-commu-
nist region and protesters globally have been learning 
from each other, so too have dictators. Morally, citizens 
eschewing violence and embracing the poignant symbol-
ism of flowers, songs, or Valentine’s Day heart shaped 
lights of course have the upper hand. However, practi-
cally speaking, they are powerless and outgunned, if 
not in some cases outnumbered if one looks at the vast 
armies of police “special forces” or actual army divisions 
deployed to suppress dissent.
It is with these considerations in mind that we 
ought to approach the potential of Russia’s forthcom-
ing elections—and the inevitable manipulations, elec-
toral protests, and suppression that go with them—to 
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effect meaningful and irreversible change in Russia’s 
regime. It is true that the scale of dissent this year has 
been unprecedented. Following the arrest of Alek-
sey Navalny, far more protesters than we have seen in 
recent years have taken to the streets. Even cities and 
regions where mass street activism had been unheard 
of witnessed rallies. This is clear if we examine over-
time regional data in the Lankina Russian Protest Event 
Dataset (LaRuPED), which shows how the country is 
divided between habitually protesting and active regions 
and those which remain largely dormant. Another trend 
promising to increase the scale of protest is that, as seen 
during the 2011–2012 protest wave, citizens are united 
not by their allegiance to a leader, a party, or a move-
ment, but rather by their antipathy towards the regime. 
There are also other dynamics that we should watch 
carefully and should not dismiss. Conventionally brack-
eted under the rubric of “demographic” or generational 
change, over the last two decades, there have been pro-
found shifts in the cultures, mentalities, and outlooks 
of Russians, not just of the younger generations, but 
also across generations. Gone are the days of the socially 
awkward, insecure, and fearful homo sovieticus. Instead, 
we are seeing confident, well-travelled Russians who are 
aware of their rights as citizens, as an electorate, and as 
taxpayers, who have embraced the values of the West-
ern middle class and who would not put up with any-
thing less than the same kinds of freedoms and dignity 
that their European neighbours enjoy.
It is in this light that we should approach the phe-
nomenal symbolism of FBK’s “Putin Palace” video. Not 
so much a stunning exposure of the full extent of the 
regime’s corruption—for many facts in the video were 
hardly new—it is a statement of the chasm between 
the values of the middle class and those of the regime. 
The former has internalised the sense of embarrassment 
associated with conspicuous consumption, and the latter 
symbolises precisely the kitsch, the vulgarity, the back-
wardness, if you wish, of the “uncool” regime. The con-
trast is clear when YouTube videos or retweets of arrests 
of prominent opposition figures—lawyers, publicists, 
journalists, intellectuals, both men and women, in their 
homes—give us a glimpse of their simple lives, the ordi-
nary apartments, the modest furnishings, the happy 
domesticity. These are people eschewing greed, corrup-
tion, and disdain for the law to pursue their passions 
and fight for the dignity of the citizens of a future Rus-
sia. Contrast that with the now notorious “bunker” of 
the old man in the Kremlin. Middle class Russian cit-
izens do not see such a lifestyle of Louis XIV palatial 
gold as “cool” or desirable as some may have during the 
“wild 1990s.” “Cool” is dignity, a rewarding and morally 
uncompromised profession, and rights, not ski helipads, 
private chapels, vineyards, or yachts.
But there is another chasm that we ought to con-
sider, that between the middle class—or, more precisely, 
the small group within it endowed with a public con-
sciousness—and the rest. I am referring to the segment 
of the middle class free from the stupor of the pres-
sures that, say, an underpaid schoolteacher or nurse 
faces daily in her work as a cog in Putin’s electoral or 
repressive machinery, what I term Russia’s “second class 
middle class” or, as the American scholar Bryn Rosen-
feld aptly characterises it, as the state-dependent “auto-
cratic middle class” segment. For, as I write in my forth-
coming book, communism in Russia never succeeded in 
fully abolishing the society of estates (sosloviya), with the 
small and superbly educated social minority of the intel-
ligentsia of noble, clergy, or urban burgher background 
outnumbered by a vast army of the latter-day peasant 
habitually underprivileged in the system of imperial 
estates and the neo-estate social gradations of commu-
nism. Furthermore, as Alexander Libman and I explore 
in a forthcoming paper in the American Political Science 
Review, these estate legacies continue to influence Rus-
sians’ orientations towards the political realm. These his-
torical considerations should be at the forefront of how 
we approach, say, the question of policing of protest in 
present-day Russia, and indeed that of other post-com-
munist autocracies like Belarus. We need to analyse the 
social milieus from which the massive army of recruits to 
Putin’s National Guard come from, and to find whether 
it is the depths of social despair and deprivation, ideo-
logical conviction, ignorance, or a combination of these 
factors that make them turn into salaried enablers of the 
regime and perpetrators of its violence.
And so I come back to the opening discussion of this 
essay. Russian and global regime strongmen do not just 
feel emboldened because they see violence happening 
across the globe, because other strongmen are doing it 
and getting away with it. They are also confident of their 
power to recruit armies of enablers, presumably from 
the habitually socially deprived groups, elements of the 
criminal world, and the underclass. And as global social 
issues abound—whether due to Covid-19, the decline 
of the petrostate, or Western sanctions—and as dic-
tators like Putin drive their economies further into the 
ground, so too are we likely to see more of the econom-
ically desperate and poor willing to trade principles for 
pay. It is for this reason that I cannot be too optimistic 
about what the intensely pointless ritualism of Russia’s 
elections this year will bring to the country in terms of 
democratic change.
Please see overleaf for information about the author.
RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 266, 8 April 2021 15
About the Author
Tomila Lankina is Professor of International Relations at the LSE’s International Relations Department. Her research 
focuses on comparative democracy and authoritarianism, protests and historical patterns of human capital and demo-
cratic reproduction in Russia and other states. She is the author of two books and has published articles in the Ameri-
can Political Science Review (forthcoming), American Journal of Political Science, British Journal of Political Science, 
Comparative Political Studies, The Journal of Politics, Comparative Politics, World Politics, Demokratizatsiya, Europe-
Asia Studies, Post-Soviet Affairs, Problems of Post-Communism, and other journals. Her latest book is on the histori-
cal drivers of inequalities and democracy in Russia. It is titled Estate Origins of Social Structure and Democracy in Rus-
sia: The Discreet Reproduction of Imperial Bourgeoisie (Through Communism and Beyond). Cambridge University Press, 
2021 (in production).
The Economic Consequences of Autocracy
By Michael Rochlitz (University of Bremen)
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000477859
In competitive democracies, elections are an institu-tion to hold a government accountable. Good per-
formance is rewarded, whereas poorly-performing gov-
ernments have difficulties getting reelected. This holds 
especially true in terms of economic performance; the 
fate of the economy probably remains the most impor-
tant factor in liberal democracies to determine if incum-
bent governments get reelected.
During Russia’s parliamentary elections in 2003 and 
2007, this was not so much different. After the economic 
crash of the 1990s, Russia’s citizens were grateful for the 
economic upturn, and for a government that seemed less 
erratic than the administration of Boris Yeltsin. Despite 
some irregularities, the decisive victories of United Rus-
sia in 2003 and 2007 seemed to be a genuine reflection 
of the public mood.
Things changed in 2011. Eclipsing the effect of some 
useful reforms during the Medvedev presidency, Vla-
dimir Putin’s decision to run again for president and to 
head United Russia resulted in a 15% loss for the party 
in the December 2011 Duma elections, as compared to 
2007. United Russia only managed to keep its major-
ity through massive electoral fraud, sparking the most 
intense public protests since the end of the Soviet Union.
To crack down on protests, Putin tightened the 
screws upon his return to the presidency, sidelining Med-
vedev’s more liberal economic team and extending the 
powers of the country’s security services. The increase 
in repression was almost immediately accompanied by 
a downturn in economic growth, although global oil 
prices remained at an all-time high. While Russia’s econ-
omy grew at an average yearly rate of 4.2% between 2010 
and 2012, growth was down to 1.5% in 2013.
By the time of the 2016 elections, the situation had 
become even worse, with Russia’s economy contrac-
ting by 1% in 2014 and 2.2% in 2015. To limit electo-
ral repercussions, the Kremlin decided to play it safe by 
making the election as uneventful as possible. United 
Russia refrained from conducting any meaningful cam-
paign, and the date of the election was brought forward 
to mid-September, when most Russians were just com-
ing home from their summer holidays. The strategy 
worked, with low turnout and significant fraud ensur-
ing that United Russia kept its majority in the Duma.
Five years on, the economic situation has now turned 
into a disaster. According to data from the World Bank 
(including an estimated economic contraction of 4% for 
2020), Russia’s GDP per capita in early 2021 is below its 
value in 2008. In other words, the average Russian citizen 
today is worse off than they were 13 years ago. In any com-
petitive democracy, a government with such a dismal eco-
nomic record would have been voted out of office long ago.
The problem is not so much the fall in oil prices since 
2014, but rather a complete lack of strategy and vision by 
the Russian government. While Putin was mainly con-
cerned with questions of foreign policy, Prime Minister 
Dmitry Medvedev showed himself to be almost embar-
rassingly weak and unable to address the problem of Rus-
sia’s sluggish growth. When he was finally replaced by 
Mikhail Mishustin in January 2020, the Covid-19 pan-
demic prevented Mishustin from introducing any signif-
icant changes, even though observers generally consider 
him to be a more competent manager than Medvedev.
The weakness of the Russian government was ampli-
fied by a shift in relative power within the Russian rul-
ing elite, away from the more liberal, technocratic man-
agers that were influential before 2012, and towards 
the security services, or siloviki. The latter either do not 
care about the business climate and the economy, do 
not understand the effect of increasing repression and 
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control on the performance of a modern market econ-
omy, or both.
Unfortunately, the situation has only become worse 
in recent years. Since about 2018, not only firms and 
entrepreneurs are constantly harassed and under attack, 
but increasingly also science and academia. As innova-
tion is a crucial input to diversify an economy away 
from oil and gas, the longer-term effects of these devel-
opments will be devastating. For most scientists work-
ing in Russia, the assertion by Russia’s security services 
that the country’s scientific output has to be protected 
from predatory foreign powers sounds bitterly ironic. 
If Russia’s researchers are no longer allowed to cooper-
ate in any meaningful way with the international scien-
tific community, and most promising young researchers 
either leave academia or the country, there will simply 
be nothing left to protect.
In Dmitry Medvedev’s defense, one has to say that 
when he was president between 2008 and 2011, there 
actually was an economic strategy. At the time, the cri-
sis of the years 2008 and 2009 had served as a wake-
up call, pushing the government to adopt more busi-
ness-friendly policies. Institutions were put into place to 
protect entrepreneurs from repression, the government 
tried to build its own Silicon Valley with the Skolkovo 
Institute of Science and Technology, and the police 
reform of 2011 actually resulted in a significant reduc-
tion of lower-level corruption. One can only speculate 
what would have happened had these policies continued.
In contrast, Vladimir Putin’s economic record since 
2012 looks bleak. Most economic reforms and initiatives 
that were started under Medvedev either fizzled out or 
were discontinued. The average overall growth rate over 
the past eight years stands at almost exactly 0%. This is 
much too low for an economy with the potential of the 
Russian Federation. Even worse, there does not seem to 
be a light at the end of the tunnel.
This lack of a perspective has led to the emergence of 
a new generation of young, motivated and talented poli-
ticians who see their future taken from them by an aging 
and incompetent political leadership. Despite immense 
odds, they try to participate in politics, to offer alter-
native solutions to Russia’s many problems. By coming 
up with the system of “smart voting” during the 2019 
Moscow city elections, they have even managed to put 
up a real political challenge to the incumbent party, in 
view of the upcoming Duma elections.
Unfortunately, instead of accepting the necessity 
of change, the Kremlin is only further tightening the 
screws. By repressing all genuine opposition, and increas-
ingly allowing only pro-Kremlin hardliners to run even 
in the systemic political parties, elections have started 
to resemble what they looked like in the Soviet Union. 
If the policies of the last years continue, this might well 
happen to Russia’s economy as well.
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Preparing for the Parliamentary Elections of 2021
By Andrei Semenov (Center for Comparative History and Politics, Perm State University)
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000477859
The upcoming September 2021 parliamentary elec-tions in Russia have already become a battlefield 
between the regime and the opposition. With the con-
stitutional amendments that allow Vladimir Putin to run 
for another term, control over the State Duma has become 
crucial to ensure a smooth transition. However, retaining 
United Russia’s (UR) majority is a challenging task: the 
party’s ratings are at a historic low, and the “smart vot-
ing” strategy promoted by Alexei Navalny threatens UR’s 
dominance in the districts. Consequently, the regime 
increasingly relies on coercion and filtering of opposi-
tion candidates. As the struggle over the Duma seats 
intensifies, even the systemic opposition parties can’t feel 
safe: their ratings are not in good shape either, and their 
potential candidates are likely to experience an additional 
pressure to clear the electoral space for the ruling party.
The state of the economy will clearly be at the center of 
the agenda. Real disposable incomes have fallen six years 
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in a row, the current exchange rate depreciates purchasing 
power for imports, and the prospects of economic recov-
ery at the moment are bleak at best. The pandemic has 
amplified the existing crisis: in 2020, inflation hit 4.9% 
annually (above the 4% Central Bank target) and unem-
ployment peaked at a historic 6.3%. Public concerns about 
rising prices, unemployment, poverty, and corruption 
remained the most salient problems according to regular 
Levada-Center polling: in August 2020, 61% mentioned 
concern about inflation (+2 pp. over the previous year), 
44% mentioned unemployment (+8 pp.), 39% poverty 
(−3 pp.), and 38% corruption and bribery (−3 pp.). The 
crisis in the economy was mentioned by 26%, ranking 7th.
Against the backdrop of the economic crisis, major 
political parties have little to offer. United Russia fol-
lows the executive’s lead and, apart from a recent string 
of coercive laws, does not offer much to alleviate the eco-
nomic pains. Not surprisingly, the party’s polling hov-
ered slightly over 30% through all of 2020, with no pro-
spects of recovery. However, the systemic opposition has 
not capitalized on this decline much: the Communist 
Party’s polling averaged 13.6% in 2020 (−1.8 pp. from 
the previous year), the Liberal-Democratic Party’s fell 
from 12.3 to 11.5%, and Just Russia gained a negligible 
0.16 pp. according to VTsIOM polls. It is the support 
for the non-parliamentary parties that has been steadily 
rising since 2017, reaching a high of 13.9% in October 
2020. Given that the share of those who won’t partici-
pate is surprisingly low (8.9% on average in 2020), the 
signs of political realignment among the voters are clear.
New political parties are unlikely to accommodate the 
demand for change. Despite breakthroughs in the regional 
elections that have allowed parties like “The Green Alter-
native” and “New People” to run for the State Duma with-
out the burden of collecting signatures, their electability 
on the federal level remains doubtful. Others—like left-
conservatives “Za Pravdu” (“For Truth”) and “Patriots 
of Russia”—preferred to merge with existing players like 
Just Russia, probably a desperate attempt at retaining 
their center-left loyalists. As Alexei Navalny’s multiple 
attempts to register his party failed, a sizeable fraction of 
voters has been effectively disenfranchised. Much will 
depend on how far the Kremlin is willing to go with its 
usual strategy of filtering out the independent candidates.
Lastly, the 2021 federal campaign will be reinforced by 
subnational elections in 50 regions (11 executive and 39 
legislative), including hotspots like Khabarovsk Krai and 
relatively competitive areas like Perm Krai and Sverdlovsk 
Region. The parallel campaigns will likely increase turnout, 
and higher turnout generally benefits the opposition. They 
also impose the additional burden of managing multiple 
elections from the center, inviting occasional miscalcula-
tions. For the opposition, it is an opportunity to bargain 
and demand concessions from the regime. On a more 
negative note, the Kremlin’s resolve to crush the January 
2021 mobilization indicates that institutional politics will 
remain closed for the most critical part of the opposition.
Parliaments matter even in authoritarian regimes, and 
the State Duma is not an exception. Apart from being 
a place for bargains between elite groups and the incum-
bent, parliaments legislate and provide a bare minimum 
of political representation. Over the years of his rule, Vla-
dimir Putin has preferred to bend the laws in his favor 
rather than bluntly violating them. Despite its reputation 
of being a toothless rubber stamp, the federal parliament is 
a key player in this regard, and to the extent the Kremlin 
needs to justify its actions legally, the future of the regime 
hinges upon the composition of the next State Duma.
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Information Wars, Opposition Coordination, and Russia’s 2021 Duma 
Election
By Regina Smyth (Indiana University and Woodrow Wilson Center)
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000477859
By 2011–2012, the Putin regime’s efforts to manage elec-toral competition created a bifurcated strategy space: 
regime candidates and parties compete for votes, while the 
opposition works to produce new information about state 
manipulation and the nature of shared grievances. While 
the opposition approach has disrupted some regional elec-
tions, by the time of the September 2021 legislative elec-
tions it has greater potential to spark widespread opposi-
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tion mobilization at the ballot box and on the streets. The 
combination of societal discontent, effective opposition 
information campaigns, and the inability to shut down 
new media platforms has challenged the state, forcing it 
to adopt risky strategies that confirm the opposition pic-
ture of an unresponsive and authoritarian government.
The Kremlin’s Mobilization Strategy
As the Kremlin’s overwhelming 2016 parliamentary vic-
tory underscored the regime’s capacity to mobilize votes, 
United Russia (UR) evolved from a skeletal party into 
a site of elite exchange of political access, career develop-
ment, and resources for loyalty. UR members staff electoral 
precincts and serve as election observers. Regional officials, 
state enterprises and bureaus can be relied on to turn out 
voters to preserve jobs and benefits. UR political technol-
ogists work with local media to shape electoral narratives. 
Technical parties, Kremlin creations developed to provide 
the illusion of choice, and carefully curated district-level 
ballots rely on loyal independents, often former UR can-
didates, and candidates available from the more than 80 
registered parties developed for the purpose of construct-
ing district-level choices that drain votes and divide opposi-
tion votes. Under this system, the regime won 55 percent 
of the vote in the party list race and 203 of 223 district 
seats, securing an absolute majority in the State Duma.
Opposition Response
State control of ballot access relegates the opposition 
to contesting each stage of the election process—from 
party registration to exposing election day falsification—
to demonstrate non-democratic processes and the lack 
of electoral accountability. In Moscow in 2019, this 
strategy led to significant protest as the CEC barred 
opposition candidates from competing.
Election Day coordination mechanisms such as the 
Navalny team’s Smart Voting system provide a focal 
point for alienated voters to coordinate and define the 
degree and nature of discontent. While this solution is 
imperfect, and many longtime democratic reform activ-
ists see it as rewarding the co-opted systemic opposition 
parties, younger people and newly engaged citizens see 
it as a viable strategy. And there is indeed growing evi-
dence that it does effect electoral outcomes, even when 
the Smart Voting candidates do not win (Turchenko and 
Golosov 2021). The pre-election information strategy is 
also evident in the Navalny Team’s latest tactic: adver-
tising of pre-registration of protest participation and 
a map of responses that illustrate the nature of opposi-
tion support across the Federation.
The 2021 Challenge
In 2021, economic stagnation, growing household debt 
and inflation of food prices, the economic effects of 
Covid-19, and the failure of the regime’s economic devel-
opment program have increased the potential for opposi-
tion voting and challenges for the regime’s mobilization 
strategy. As in the 2011 Duma election, new media is 
buzzing with discussions of how to best express opposi-
tion in the absence of real choice, a precursor to electoral 
engagement, protest voting, and street actions. Unlike 
in 2011, this new opposition stretches across geography 
and class. It also increasingly draws on non-political and 
civic activism to provide structure, expertise, and tacti-
cal skills to enable voter coordination (Zhuravlev, Save-
lyeva, and Erpyleva 2020; Zhelnina 2020).
In response, the regime has bolstered its mobilization 
strategy with new tactics. It is touting electoral appeals 
that promise increased social benefits in exchange for 
voter loyalty. Developed through the successful national 
vote on constitutional reform, social support will be the 
focus of the UR campaign, usurping the programmatic 
claims of other parties and Navalny’s left-center popu-
lism (Smyth and Sokhey 2021).
Second, the regime has intensified efforts to drown 
out opposition signals, muting alternative media sources 
by circumscribing Twitter and TikTok and colonizing 
new media space with pre-installed Russian apps on 
devices sold in the Federation. Regional governors are 
creating portals for voters to lodge complaints and col-
lect information about citizen preferences. The Krem-
lin has developed a similar information monitoring sys-
tem that bypasses governors and sends details about 
voters’ grievances to political technologists in the Pres-
idential Administration. High-profile crackdowns on 
Alexei Navalny, his team, and independent deputies 
have extended into the civic space to break the connec-
tion between non-political activism and electoral mobi-
lization and silence critical voices. Finally, the Kremlin 
is mimicking the Smart Voting strategy with its own 
“Smart Voice” app, one of many new tools that co-opt 
opposition tactics.
Finally, recent actions against pension reform and 
Covid-19 have revealed conflict within the Communist 
Party, and disdain among its rank-and-file for its lead-
ership’s collaboration with the Kremlin. The February 
2021 pro-Navalny protests highlighted new schisms 
as rising regional party leaders expressed support for 
Navalny and his social democratic policy program. The 
Kremlin is retaliating against its loyal systemic opposi-
tion with left technical parties and exclusion from par-
ticipation in electoral monitoring programs.
These actions raise the cost of a Kremlin victory and 
provide new information for opposition voters, kicking 
off a new cycle of innovation. As elections emerge as 
a focal point of discontent and dashed expectations, the 
Kremlin’s mobilization strategy becomes more uncertain 
and the potential for post-election protest rises. As the 
RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 266, 8 April 2021 19
Soviet elections of 1989 and 1990 demonstrated, opposi-
tion coordination can be achieved through kitchen talk 
and low-tech information transfer, such as the Navalny 
strategy of combining online and offline communica-
tion to spread the word about opposition voting tactics. 
While revolution is not an inevitable outcome, these 
moments can yield unexpected outcomes.
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